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Abstract—Much prior work in integrating high-level artiﬁcial
intelligence planning technology with low-level robotic control has
foundered on the signiﬁcant representational diﬀerences between
these two areas of research. We discuss a proposed solution to
this representational discontinuity in the form of object-action
complexes (OACs). The pairing of actions and objects in a single
interface representation captures the needs of both reasoning
levels, and will enable machine learning of high-level action
representations from low-level control representations.
I. I  B
The diﬀerent representations that are eﬀective for continu-
ous control of robotic systems and the discrete symbolic AI
presents a signiﬁcant challenge for integrating AI planning
research and robotics. These areas of research should be able
to inform one another. However, in practice, many collabo-
rations have foundered on the representational diﬀerences. In
this paper, we propose the use of object-action complexes[1]
to address the representational diﬀerence between these rea-
soning components.
The representations used in the robotics community can
be generally characterized as vectors of continuous values.
These vectors may be used to represent absolute points in
three dimensional space, relative points in space, joint angles,
force vectors, and even world-level properties that require real-
valued models [2]. Such representations allow system builders
to succinctly specify robot behavior since most if not all, of
the computations for robotic control are eﬀectively captured
as continuous transforms of continuous vectors over time. AI
representations, on the other hand, have focused on discrete
symbolic representations of objects and actions, usually us-
ing propositional or ﬁrst-order logics. Such representations
typically focus on modeling the high-level conceptual state
changes that result from action execution, rather than the low-
level continuous details of action execution.
Neither of the representational systems alone cover the
requirements for controlling deliberate action, however, both
levels seem to be required to produce human level behavioral
control. Our objective is to propose an interface representation
that will both allow the eﬀective exchange of information
between these two levels and the learning of high level action
representations on the basis of the information provided by
the robotic control system.
Any such representation must provide clear semantics, and
be easily manipulable at both levels. Further it must leverage
the respective strengths of the two representation levels. In
particular, the robotic control system’s access to the actual
physical state of the world through its sensors and eﬀectors
is essential to learning the actions the planning system must
reason about. Each low-level action executed by the robot of-
fers the opportunity to observe a small instantiated fragment of
the state transition function that the AI action representations
must capture. Therefore, we propose that the robotic control
system provide fully instantiated fragments of the planning
domains state transition function, that is captured during low-
level execution, to the high-level AI system to enable the
learning of abstract action representations. We will call such
a fragment an instantiated state transition fragment (ISTF),
and deﬁne it to be a situated pairing of an object and an
action that captures a small, but fully instantiated, fragment of
the planning domain’s state transition function. The process
of learning domain invariants from repeated, reproducible
instances of very similar ISTFs will result in generalizations
over such instances that we will call object-action complexes
(OACs). To see how this is done, the rest of this paper will
ﬁrst discuss a detailed view of a robot control system, then
we will discuss an AI planning level description of the same
domain. We will then more formally deﬁne ISTFs and OACS,
show how ISTFs can be produced by the robot control system,
and how OACs relate to the AI planning level description. We
will then discuss the learning of OACs on the basis of ISTFs.
To do all this, we require a particular domain for the robot
to interact with. Imagine a relatively standard but simple robot
control scenario illustrated in Figure 1. It consists of an arm
with a gripper, a table with two light colored cubes and one
dark colored cube. The robot has the task of placing the cubes
into a box, also located on the table. We will also assume the
robot is provided with a camera to view the objects in the
domain. However, at the initial stage, the system does not
have any knowledge of those objects. The only initial world
knowledge available to the system is provided by the vision
module, and the hard-coded action reﬂexes that this visual
input can elicit.Fig. 1. Illustration of how object classes are discovered from basic
uninformed reﬂex actions.
II. V- R D D  O 
A
We assume a vision front-end based on an Early Cognitive
Vision framework (see [3]) that provides a scene representation
composed of local 3D edge descriptors that outline the visible
contours of the scene [4]. Because the system lacks knowledge
of the objects that make up the scene, this visual world
representation is unsegmented: descriptors that belongs to one
of the objects in the scene are not explicitly distinct from the
ones belonging to another object, or to the background (this is
marked by question marks in Figure 1-2). This segmentation
problem has been largely addressed in the literature [5], [6],
[7]. However, while these segmentation methods are purely
vision-based and do not require of the agent to interact with
the scene they are unsatisfying for our purpose because they
assume certain qualities from the objects in order to segment
them: e.g., constant color or texture, moving objects, etc.
Instead we will approach the problem from another angle:
we will assume that the agent is endowed with a basic reﬂex
action [8] (Figure 1-3) that is elicited directly by speciﬁc visual
feature combinations in the unsegmented world representation.
The outcome of these reﬂexes will allow the agent to gather
further knowledge about the scene. This information will be
used to segment the visual world into objects and identify their
aﬀordances.
We will only consider a single kind of reﬂex here: the
agent tries to grasp any planar surface in the scene.1 The
likely locations of such planar surfaces are inferred from the
presence of a coplanar pair of edges in the unsegmented visual
world. This type of reﬂex action is described in [8]. Every time
the agent executes such a reﬂex, haptic information allows
the system to evaluate the outcome: either the grasp was
successful and the gripper is holding something, or it failed
and the gripper closed on thin air. A failed attempt drives
the agent to reconsider its original assumption (the presence
of a graspable plane at this location in the scene), whereas
a successful attempt conﬁrms the feasibility of this reﬂex.
Moreover, once a successful grasp has been performed, the
agent has gained physical control over some part of the scene
1Note that other kind of reﬂex actions could be devised to enable other
basic actions than grasping.
(i.e. the object grasped, Figure 1-4). If we assume that we
know the full kinematics of the robot’s arm (which is true for
an industrial robot), it is then possible to segment the grasped
object from the rest of the visual world as it is the only part
that moves synchronously with the arm of the robot. At this
point a new “object” relevant for the higher level planning
model is “born”.
Having physical control of an object allows the agent
to segment it and to visually inspect it under a variety of
viewpoints and construct an internal representation of the full
3D shape of the object (see [9]). This shape can then be stored
as the description of newly discovered class A (Figure 1-
5) that aﬀords grasp-reﬂex-A encoding the initial reﬂex that
“discovered” the object.
The object held in the gripper is the ﬁrst instance a1 of the
class A. The agent can use its new knowledge of class A to
reconsider its interpretation of the scene: using a simple object
recognition process (based on the full 3D representation of the
class), all other instances (e.g., in our example a2) of the class
in the scene are identiﬁed and segmented from the unknown
visual world.
Thus through a reﬂex-based exploration of the unknown
visual world object classes can be discovered by the system
until it achieves an informed, fully segmented representation of
the world, where all objects are instances of symbolic classes
and carry basic aﬀordances.
To distinguish the speciﬁc successful instances of the robot’s
reﬂexes, we will refer to the speciﬁc instance of the reﬂex that
was successful for the object as a particular motor program.
Note that such motor programs are deﬁned relative to a portion
of an object, in our example, the surface that was grasped.
We will extend this by assuming all motor programs can be
deﬁned relative to some object.
The early cognitive vision system [4], the grasping reﬂex
[8] as well as the accumulation mechanism [9] that together
provides a segmentation of the local feature descriptors into
independent objects currently exist in one integrated system
that we will use as a foundation for this architecture.
III. R AI P A
As we have noted, we can also model this robot domain
scenario using a formal AI representation. In this case, we
will formalize the robot domain using the Linear Dynamic
Event Calculus (LDEC) [10], [11], a logical language that
combines aspects of the situation calculus with linear and
dynamic logics, to model dynamically-changing worlds[12],
[13], [14].
Our LDEC representation will deﬁne the following actions.
Deﬁnition 1: High-Level Domain Actions
• grasp(x) – move the gripper to pick up object x,
• ungrasp(x) – release the object x in the gripper,
• moveEmptyGripperTo(`) – move an empty gripper to the
speciﬁed location `,
• moveFullGripperTo(`) – move a full gripper to the spec-
iﬁed location `.These actions represent higher level counterparts of some
of the motor programs available to the robot controller, but
already these actions incorporate elements of the state of the
world that are not part of robotic control representations of
actions. For instance, ungrasp models an action that is quite
similar to a motor program that performs this operation. Ac-
tions like moveEmptyGripperTo and moveFullGripperTo, on
the other hand, are much more abstract and encode information
about the state of the world (i.e. the gripper is empty or full).
Note that in this case the actions partition the low-level “move
gripper” motor-programs into two separate actions that, as we
will see, can more readily be learned from the available ISTFs.
This representation will also allow us to bypass the learning
of the conditional eﬀects[15] of such actions.
Our LDEC representation will also include a number of
high-level properties.
Deﬁnition 2: High-Level Domain Properties
• graspable(x) – a predicate that indicates whether an
object x is graspable or not,
• gripperLoc = ` – a function that indicates the current
location of the gripper is `,
• objInGripper = x – a function that indicates the object in
the gripper is x; x is nil if the gripper is empty,
• objLoc(x) = ` – a function that indicates the location of
object x is `.
Finally, we also specify a set of “exogenous” domain proper-
ties.
Deﬁnition 3: Exogenous Domain Properties
• over(x) = ` – a function that returns a location ` over
the object x,
• locOnTable(`1) = `2 – a function that returns a location
`2 relative to the table (e.g., on the table or in a box) for
another location `1 above the table.
Like the properties in Deﬁnition 2, the exogenous properties
model high-level features of the domain. However, unlike
domain properties that are directly tracked by the high-level
AI model; exogenous properties are information provided to
the high-level AI system by some external (possibly lower
level) source. (We will say more about exogenous properties
in Section VI.)
Using these actions and properties we can write LDEC
axioms that capture the dynamics of the robot scenario de-
scribed in Table I). Action precondition axioms describe the
properties that must hold of the world to apply a given action
(i.e., aﬀordances), while the eﬀect axioms characterize what
changes as a result of the action. These axioms also encode
the STRIPS assumption: ﬂuents that aren’t directly aﬀected
by an action are assumed to remain unchanged by that action
[16].
We note our LDEC axiomatization is readily able to accom-
modate the indexical, or relative information. For example,
an instantiated function like over(box1) represents a form of
indexical knowledge, rather than a piece of deﬁnite infor-
mation like the coordinates of the box in three dimensional
space. Moreover, our LDEC axiomatization can model spatial
TABLE I
LDEC A  H-L D A
LDEC Action Precondition Axioms
objInGripper = nil ∧ graspable(x) ⇒ aﬀords(grasp(x))
objInGripper = x ∧ x , nil ⇒ aﬀords(ungrasp(x))
objInGripper = nil ⇒ aﬀords(moveEmptyGripperTo(`))
objInGripper = x ∧ x , nil ⇒ aﬀords(moveFullGripperTo(`))
LDEC Eﬀect Axioms

aﬀords(grasp(x))
	
(

grasp(x)

objInGripper = x ∧ gripperLoc = objLoc(x)

aﬀords(ungrasp(x))
	
(

ungrasp(x)

objInGripper = nil ∧ objLoc(x) = locOnTable(objLoc(x))

aﬀords(moveEmptyGripperTo(`))
	
(

moveEmptyGripperTo(`)

gripperLoc = `

aﬀords(moveFullGripperTo(`))
	
(

moveFullGripperTo(`)

gripperLoc = ` ∧ objLoc(objInGripper) = `
relationships expressed with respect to objects. For instance,
moveFullGripperTo(over(box1)) can represent an action in-
stance that moves the object in the gripper to a location “over
box1”
Intuitively, the information encoded in a collection of LDEC
axioms captures a generalization of the information in a
larger set of ISTFs. The action precondition axioms capture
information from the initial state of an ISTF and the action
executed, while the eﬀect axioms capture the generalities for
the initial state to ﬁnal state mappings from an ISTFs. As such
we believe they can be learned from the ISTFs.
It is easy to show that this representation supports high-level
planning. For instance, with these axioms it is trivial for an
AI planner to construct the following simple plan:

grasp(obj1);moveFullGripperTo(over(box1));ungrasp(obj1)

,
to put an object obj1 into box1, from a state in which the
robot’s gripper is empty. However, building even this sort of
simple plan from ﬁrst principles is well beyond the capability
of the robot controller alone.
So far we have shown that a low level robot controller is
capable of producing ISTFs for a domain, we have shown a
way an AI level planner could formalize the same domain,
and we have shown the necessity of using the AI planner
with the robot controller to produce high level behavior. In the
remainder of the paper we will outline a process whereby we
can learn the AI level representation from the ISTFs produced
by the robot controller.
IV. B R C  P  ISTF 
OAC
With these two views of the problem in hand, we now,
consider how we can bridge the two representational levels.
We see that we can obtain a wealth of object-centric infor-
mation each time the robotic system successfully grasps an
object: the object grasped, the type of grasping reﬂex used, the
relative position of the gripper, the fact that the object has beeneﬀectively grasped and is now in the gripper instead of being
on the table, etc. This association of before and after states
of a particular “grasp” motor program with a speciﬁc domain
object meets our deﬁnition of an ISTF. It completely describes
a fragment of the planning domain’s transition function.
We more formally deﬁne an ISTF as a tuple D
si,mpj,Objmpi, si+1
E
comprised of the initial sensed
state of the world si, a motor program instance mpj, the
whole object containing the component the motor program
was deﬁned relative to Objmpi, and the state that results from
executing the motor program si+1. Keep in mind that the state
representations for this ISTF contain all of the information
the robot has about the two states of the world. Some of
which may be relevant some of which may be completely
irrelevant to the outcome of the action.
It will be the task of the learning module to abstract
away this irrelevant information from the ISTFs to produce
OACs that contain only the relevant instantiated information
needed to eﬀectively predict the applicability of the action
and the likely eﬀects of the action. This is only possible if the
system is provided with multiple encounters with reproducible
ISTFs. Thus as the system repeatedly interacts with the world
it is presented with multiple very similar ISTFs which it
generalizes into OACs, thereby learning a representation that
is not unlike the one we speciﬁed in the previous section.
On this basis, we deﬁne an OAC as a generalized ISTF
tuple:
D
S i, MPj,Objk,S i+1
E
comprised of two abstracted states
(S i and S i+1) a set of motor programs MPj, and an object
class Objk. The initial state of the world, S i, is abstracted
to contain only those properties that are necessary for any of
the set of motor-programs in MPj when acting on an object
of class Objk to result in an state that is satisﬁed but the
abstracted state deﬁnition S i+1. Thus such an OAC contains
all of the information found in our initial LDEC deﬁnitions
for this domain.
Given the parallels to LDEC representations how are OACs
diﬀerent? The answer to this is, a very subtle point. OACs
constrain the kinds of LDEC rules that can be learned. First
OACs distribute information in a subtly diﬀerent manner than
LDEC rules. An OAC contains information normally found in
two diﬀerent parts of the LDEC representation. By bringing
together information found in precondition rules with the
eﬀect rules and the object in question they allow learning to
take place that previously couldn’t have been accomplished.
Second the heavy use of the object and the object centeredness
of OACS produce LDEC representations that easily lend
themselves to a simple forward looking planning algorithm
that is heavily directed by the aﬀordances of the available
objects. Third and ﬁnally the use of OACs constrains the
LDEC representations to a simple form of axioms that are
easier to learn. For example, without more complex machinery,
OACs induced from ISTFs are not able to create action repre-
sentations with conditional eﬀects. Learning such conditional
eﬀects of actions is a signiﬁcant problem for other approaches.
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Fig. 2. Hetero-associative net: Storage and Retrieval
V. L A R
The ability of a low level robotic control system to identify
world-level objects only takes us part of the way to kind of
representation we have just described. We must learn from
the ISTFs coherent, high-level actions. Our current proposal
for learning such action representations involves the use of
Willshaw nets or Associative Nets(AN).
ANs were ﬁrst was described in [17], [18] following early
work by [19] and [20] extended by [21] and [22]. They
illustrate three basic properties which are characteristic of
mechanisms involved in phenomena of human memory and
attention: 1) non-localized storage (“Distributivity”), 2) recov-
ery of complete stored patterns from partial or noisy input
(“Graceful Degradation”), and 3) eﬀective functioning even in
the face of damage (“Holographic Memory”).
ANs associate pairs of input and output vectors using a grid
of horizontal input lines and vertical output lines with binary
switches (triangles) at the intersections (Figure 2). To store
an association between the input vector and the output vector,
switches are turned on (black triangles) at the intersection of
lines which correspond to a 1 in both input and output patterns.
To retrieve the associate of the input, a signal is sent down
each input line corresponding to a 1 in the input. When this
signal encounters an “on” switch, it increments the signal on
the corresponding output line by one. The output lines are
then thresholded at a level corresponding to the number of
“on” bits in the input. If we store an input pattern with itself as
output (an auto-associative net), ANs can be used to complete
partial patterns, as needed to recall perceptually non-evident
properties of objects, such as the fact that the red cube on
the table aﬀords grasping. This is exactly the information
that is encoded in action precondition axioms. Further it is
worthwhile to notice that all of the information needed for this
AN is available in each new instance of an ISTF. In this case,
the input and output patterns for the AN are the same: the
initial state, action, and object for a cluster of reproducable
ISTFs observed in the course of interacting with the world.
We thereby use repeated presentations of very similar ISTFs
(clustered by action and object) to train auto-associative ANs
to eﬀectively store and retrieve associations between the LDEC
action precondition axioms and the property of aﬀording suchLDEC operators.
Now consider the LDEC style eﬀect axioms. Rather than
using an auto-associative net we can use a hetero-associative
network for this task. In this case, we again use the initial
state, action, and object as the input pattern from each ISTF,
however as the output pattern we use the resulting state from
the ISTF. This will allow us to learn and retrieve the state-
change transitions associated with LDEC operators, with states
represented as sparse vectors of relevant facts or propositions.
Thus, we hypothesize that such associations can be learned
in ANs using repeated presenations of reproducable ISTFs
using the Perceptron Learning Algorithm (PLA). We replace
the binary AN switches with continuous valued switches and
use multiple ISTFs that have the same action, object, and
resulting state and the PLA to adjust the weights on the
relevant switches. We believe that such an approach can learn
consistent state changes or actions, and learn the association
between preconditions and associated aﬀordances.
More speciﬁcally, in the envisioned scenario, as the robot
controller explores the world, successful grasps will produce
ISTFs. On the basis of multiple reproducable experiences
of particular ISTFs we can learn the instantiated versions
of the precondition axioms and the eﬀect axioms for the
robots actions. The resulting state in each ISTF will vary only
in terms of the object-type grasped and the grippers pose.
Further, the invariants can be learned as a basis for classifying
the world into object classes and action types. As we have
discussed, identiﬁers for actions-types can then be associated
with the input conditions for the action via an auto-associative
net. Such aﬀordances are added by adding new input and
output lines to the net for the new aﬀordance, and using the
existing learning algorithm.
This network can be presented with a possibly incomplete
set of properties representing the current state of the world, and
used to retrieve a complete model of the world state, including
non-perceptually available associates including the aﬀordances
and object classes.(Figure 3) For ease of exposition, in this
and the following ﬁgures we will continue to show weights
of 0 and 1. The full pattern including aﬀordances can then be
input to the other hetero-associative net, and used to retrieve
the eﬀects of carrying out particular actions. (Figure 4).
If the output states and aﬀordances are the same following
two diﬀerent grasp actions for a particular input state, then
clearly the eﬀects (as far as the learner and planner are
concerned) of the two grasps are the same for that input. If the
eﬀects are the same for all inputs then the grasps are equivalent
and can be collapsed together. We discuss this next.
A. Learning Multiple Grasp Actions
Recall from our discussion of the high-level action grasp
that at the lower level there may in fact be many low-level
grasps available to the robot at any point. While many of these
grasping actions may have eﬀects that are indistinguishable
from one another, there will also be grasping actions that
result in very diﬀerent eﬀects. Given this, and our desire
to avoid the diﬃculties of learning actions with conditional
Fig. 3. Retrieval of aﬀords(grasp(x)) from objInGripper = nil∧graspable(x)
in the loaded auto-associative net
Fig. 4. Retrieval of eﬀect grasp(x) from the hetero-associative net
eﬀects, it becomes clear that we will need multiple grasp
actions at the higher level of abstraction. To distinguish these
actions and their eﬀects during planning and learning we
will introduce multiple predicates indicating “graspability” by
particular motor programs.
Our learning process now operates as follows: when an
object is “born” at the lower level of representation (See
Section II), the message for the addition of the object (e.g.,
obj23) should include an identiﬁer for the speciﬁc action that
was executed (e.g., grasp28, grasp95, etc.) as well as asserting
the existence of a new predicate indicating the object has that
action as an aﬀordance (e.g., aﬀords(grasp28(obj23))).2 This
predicate is added to the AN and can be used for learning.
2Although we only consider grasping actions, we assume other actions,
such as pushing, also result in the “birth” of an object-aﬀordance complex.We make the strong assumption that the invariants of the
domain map onto the input units of the associative network,
which we assume in animals have evolved to this end and for
the robot must be built in, are such as to ensure that when
distinct low-level motor programs are indistinguishable at the
higher level of abstraction, they will automatically be classiﬁed
as instances of a single action.
VI. U L A A R
We have described a process that results in learning ab-
stracted action representations that should be close to the
LDEC representations we have sketched for this domain.
However, by abstracting the actions in this way there remains
a number of open concerns we must address.
a) Using Learned Action Knowledge with New Objects:
All new objects are initially associated with “new” actions.
Our problem is to associate a previously unseen motor-
program object pair with an existing high-level action or to
mark it as a new action that must be learned at the high level.
b) Using Learned Action Knowledge for Execution: It
will be necessary to convert our learned abstract actions to
speciﬁc motor programs for execution. Keeping the list of
the motor program-object pairs abstracted by each high-level
action should address this issue. Since all abstracted pairs for
a given action should be equivalent, we suggest selecting any
one that matches the object bound in the high level plan.
c) Learning Exogenous Domain Properties: Although
we have described a process for learning certain domain
properties, the question remains as to how we will learn the
exogenous properties given in Deﬁnition 3. For the present we
simply assume the presence of over as an exogenous domain
property that is computed by a lower level function.
VII. C
This paper has argued that object-action complexes (OACs)
grounded from instantiated actions in robot control-space, can
be used as an interface between the very diﬀerent represen-
tation languages of robot control and AI planning. We have
shown that OACS can be embodied in an Associative Net, and
that they can be learned by a very simple machine-learning
algorithm. Almost all of these claims are unproven but we
oﬀer them as deﬁning a research program that we shall be
pursuing in the coming years in order to combine existing
robot platforms and existing planners based on LDEC and
other situation/event calculi.
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